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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Randy C. Eiland was found guilty of felony battery with
intent to commit a serious felony and felony burglary, with a persistent violator
sentencing enhancement.

The district court imposed a unified sentence of life

imprisonment, with twenty years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Eiland asserts the district court
abused its discretion when it denied the last motion for a continuance he filed, because
the denial prejudiced his due process right to a fair trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
During Mr. Eiland’s jury trial, Muzna Saied (Ms. Saied), and her daughter
Mala Saied (Mala), testified there was a knock on the front door of their Sandpoint
house one morning, but nobody was at the door when they checked. (Tr., Sept. 14,
2015, p.15, L.17 – p.16, L.14, p.17, L.10 – p.20, L.6, p.75, Ls.8-13, p.76, L.9 – p.77,
L.24.)1 Ms. Saied, her husband Raffat Saied (Mr. Saied), and Mala then heard a sound
from the basement, and Ms. Saied and Mala ran upstairs to the bedroom where
Mr. Saied had been sleeping. (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.20, Ls.7-25, p.50, Ls.8-10, p.55,
L.24 – p.56, L.20, p.78, Ls.1-7.) Mr. Saied testified he went out of the bedroom to the
stairs and said: “Who’s there?” (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.57, Ls.7-8.) He testified he saw
a man at the bottom of the staircase, who said: “Guess what? Somebody broke in the
house . . . and it was me.” (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.57, Ls.9-13.)

All citations to “Tr., Sept. 14, 2015” refer to the 107-page transcript volume titled “Trial
Proceedings September 14, 2015.” There is a separate volume that contains the jury
voir dire from September 14, 2015.
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The Saieds testified the man came up the stairs and then began spraying them
with bear spray or pepper spray. (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.21, Ls.21-24, p.57, L.15 – p.58,
L.15.) Mr. Saied went back into the bedroom and tried to close the door, but the man
put his foot in the doorway and continued to try to spray them. (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015,
p.22, Ls.12-15, p.58, Ls.12-15, p.78, Ls.20-23.)

While being sprayed, the Saieds

pushed on the door to keep the man out of the bedroom, for about seven to ten
minutes. (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.23, Ls.20-22, p.58, Ls.15-25, p.79, Ls.10-18.)

After

Mr. Saied screamed to call 911, the man’s foot was no longer in the door, and Mr. Saied
called the police. (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.22, L.20 – p.23, L.25, p.59, L.6 – p.60, L.2.)
Mr. Saied testified the man was bald, tall, and wearing a jacket. (Tr., Sept. 14,
2015, p.57, Ls.10-12.) Mr. Saied also testified, “I saw there in the glimpse I had or the
memory I had was something red.” (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.62, Ls.19-20.) Ms. Saied
testified she saw the man as he was coming up the stairs, and he was tall, bald, and
wearing a red jacket. (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.38, L.24 – p.39, L.10.) Mala testified all
she saw was “a bit of a red jacket and a hand coming through the door spraying.”
(Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.83, L.25 – p.84, L.10.)
Officer Inman and Detective Chamberlain with the Sandpoint Police Department
testified that they were among the officers who responded to a reported unlawful entry
or home invasion at the Saieds’ address, with a possible suspect described as wearing
a red or a red and black jacket. (See Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.86, L.17 – p.89, L.20;
Tr., Sept. 15, 2015, p.177, L.21 – p.179, L.24.)

At the scene, they saw a broken-in

glass door at the rear of the house. (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.91, Ls.8-22; Tr., Sept. 15,
2015, p.181, Ls.1-25.) Detective Chamberlain had Officer Inman collect samples of the
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glass shards from the door. (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.103, Ls.1-4; Tr., Sept. 15, 2015,
p.183, Ls.1-5.) Officer Inman also collected a can of bear spray that was near the
house’s front door. (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.94, L.25 – p.95, L.13, p.105, Ls.12-16.) The
audio from Officer Inman’s dash cam depicted the police interviewing the Saieds at the
scene together at the same time. (See Tr., Sept. 15, 2015, p.27, L.5 – p.29, L.11; Def.
Ex. A.)
After the police received a report of a man potentially matching the description of
the suspect at a nearby Department of Labor office, Sergeant Giffin found a man who
matched the description of the suspect outside the office. (See Tr., Sept. 15, 2015,
p.57, L.13 – p.58, L.2, p.61, L.12 – p.62, L.5, p.109, L.17 – p.110, L.22, p.190, Ls.1722.) Sergeant Giffin testified he detained and handcuffed the man, and identified the
man as Mr. Eiland from his driver’s license. (Tr., Sept. 15, 2015, p.62, L.17 – p.64,
L.10.) Chief Coon and Detectives Chamberlain and Herberer testified that when they
arrived at the Department of Labor, Mr. Eiland smelled of pepper spray and had other
signs of contact with pepper spray. (Tr., Sept. 15, 2015, p.69, Ls.6-15, p.77, L.20 –
p.79, L.13, p.92, Ls.3-12, p.109, L.17 – p.112, L.25, p.192, L.20 – p.193, L.10.)
However, Sergeant Giffin testified he did not notice any odors or anything about
Mr. Eiland. (Tr., Sept. 15, 2015, p.64, Ls.11-14.)
Detective Herberer testified the Saieds were brought to the scene to do a
“showup” identification.

(Tr., Sept. 15, 2015, p.87, L.24 – p.88, L.1.)

Chief Coon

testified he brought Mr. Saied and Mala in two separate transports to the Department of
Labor to identify the subject. (Tr., Sept. 16, 2015, p.371, L.13 – p.373, L.12.) Mr. Saied
testified, “when the Chief of Police drove me to the site, and he said, ‘There he is.’ And
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I said, ‘But he was wearing a red jacket.’ And from—from the picture you can tell that
the inside of the jacket was red.” (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.62, L.23 – p.63, L.2; see
State’s Ex. 13.) Mr. Saied also testified he stated he was eighty percent sure, and Chief
Coon told him to look at the inside of the jacket, which was red. (See Tr., Sept. 14,
2015, p.65, Ls.2-16, p.72, Ls.11-25.) Mr. Saied testified at trial that Mr. Eiland was the
man in the house. (See Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.64, L.1 – p.65, L.3.)
On cross-examination, Mala testified she had told Chief Coon, “Yes, that is the
guy,” and she based her identification on the subject wearing a red jacket. (Tr., p.85,
Ls.1-19.) Ms. Saied, when asked at trial whether or not Mr. Eiland was the man in the
house, testified, “I’m not a hundred percent, but, yes. I would say could be him, yeah.”
(Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.39, Ls.20-24.)
Detective Chamberlain testified that after Mr. Eiland was transported to the jail
and searched, he saw small shards or cubes of glass on the floor that had not been
therefore before Mr. Eiland was searched. (Tr., Sept. 15, 2015, p.194, L.2 – p.197,
L.19.) More glass shards were found in Mr. Eiland’s clothing. (Tr., Sept. 15, 2015,
p.199, L.7 – p.200, L.4.) Christopher Hamburg, a forensic scientist and expert witness
for the State, testified he had analyzed samples of those glass shards and the glass
shards from the broken door at the Saieds’ house. (See Tr., Sept. 16, 2015, p.285,
Ls.11-16, p.303, L.4 – p.305, L.4.) Mr. Hamburg testified the glass shards could share
a common source. (Tr., Sept. 16, 2015, p.308, Ls.9-14.)
The State charged Mr. Eiland by Information with one count of felony battery with
intent to commit a serious felony, Idaho Code §§ 18-903 and 18-911, one count of
felony aggravated battery, I.C. §§ 18-903 and 18-907, and one count of felony burglary,
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I.C. § 18-1401. (R., pp.97-98.) Mr. Eiland entered a not guilty plea. (R., p.102.) The
State later filed an Amended Information also charging Mr. Eiland with a persistent
violator sentencing enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514. (R., pp.114-16.)
Mr. Eiland filed, pro se, a “Motion to Dismiss Counsel and Appointment of
Standby Counsel.” (R., pp.130-34.) The district court allowed Mr. Eiland to represent
himself and appointed standby counsel for him.

(Tr., Mar. 6, 2015, p.22, Ls.2-13

(sealed transcript).)
The district court had scheduled Mr. Eiland’s jury trial for April 13, 2015.
(R., pp.107-11.) After Mr. Eiland told the district court he wanted the trial set out so he
could get ready for trial, the district court vacated the trial date and rescheduled the trial
for July 13, 2015. (R., p.156; Tr., Mar. 20, 2015, p.10, L.11 – p.11, L.24.) The district
court subsequently reset the trial for June 8, 2015, and explained it had moved the trial
forward because Mr. Eiland’s case “needs to be tried” and there were other cases with
priority settings for July and the following months. (R., pp.187-91; Tr., May 5, 2015,
p.19, Ls.7-22.)
Mr. Eiland filed a motion requesting funds for photographs he needed in his
defense, forensic testing, and expert testimony. (See R., pp.165-67.) He also filed a
motion requesting funds for phone calls so that he could talk to expert witnesses and
others he saw as important to assist him in his defense. (See R., pp.172-74.)

At the

hearing on the motions, Mr. Eiland specified he had found a forensic expert,
William Schneck, to “do reenactment of the scene” and “test the coat for the presence of
the alleged bear spray use.” (See Tr., May 5, 2015, p.22, L.3 – p.23, L.16; R., p.196.)
The district court issued an order stating it would pay for phone time to allow Mr. Eiland
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to call witnesses and do trial preparation work. (R., pp.195-197.) The order further
stated that upon a showing that Mr. Schneck was available the week of trial and was
willing and able to perform forensic services for the defense, “the Court will authorize a
reasonable amount of funds to allow Mr. Eiland to hire Mr Schneck as a defense expert
in this matter.” (R., p.196.)
Mr. Eiland then filed a motion requesting an “extension of time before trial.”
(R., pp.259-61.)

At the hearing on the motion, the district court characterized the

request as one for “basically a continuance of his trial.” (Tr., May 22, 2015, p.3, Ls.5-6.)
Mr. Eiland stated he had only recently found out he had received the money to call for
expert witnesses, and he needed additional time to reach expert witnesses and prepare
for trial. (See Tr., May 22, 2015, p.6, L.13 – p.7, L.17.) The district court continued
Mr. Eiland’s trial to August 10, 2015. (R., pp.270-74.)
Later, Mr. Eiland sent a letter to the district court requesting an order “granting
him funding for Mr. [sic] Daniel Reisberg, Psychology Department on co-witness
contamination.” (R., pp.284-85.) The district court described the letter as a motion for
funds to hire Dr. Reisberg as a defense expert. (See R., p.302; Tr., June 15, 2015,
p.18, Ls.12-17.)

At a hearing on the request, Mr. Eiland explained he wanted

Dr. Reisberg to testify on possible cross-contamination of witnesses, because the
alleged victims “were all interviewed at one time together; they were not separated.”
(Tr., June 15, 2015, p.21, Ls.5-11.) The district court issued an order stating that upon
a showing that Dr. Reisberg was available to testify the week of trial and willing and able
to testify for the defense, “the Court will authorize a reasonable amount of funds to allow
Mr. Eiland to hire Dr. Reisberg as a defense expert in this matter.” (R., pp.302-05.)
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Mr. Eiland subsequently filed a motion for a continuance. (R., pp.309-13.) The
district court issued an order continuing the trial until September 14, 2015 “in order to
allow Mr. Eiland additional time to have evidence analyzed by William Schneck and to
interview witnesses.” (R., pp.322-24; see R., pp.325-29.) The order also provided,
“[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances the court will not entertain any further motions by
Mr. Eiland to continue this trial.” (R., p.323.)
Mr. Eiland later filed another motion for funds, requesting funds for the services
of Mr. Schneck and “Geoffrey Loftus, Ph.D, Psychologist,” as “necessary to prepare an
effective defense.” (R., pp.351-52.) Additionally, he filed a “Motion In Limine/Dismiss”
requesting the district court exclude out-of-court identification “because it is hearsay and
violates the Defendant’s due process rights.” (R., pp.355-56.) The motion in limine also
asserted in-court identification would violate Mr. Eiland’s right to due process.
(R., p.355.)
Further, Mr. Eiland sent a “Stipulated Motion to Continue Trial,” stating “the
parties request a two (2) month continuance to allow for hearings and for ongoing
investigation and forensic analysis results that are outstanding.”

(R., pp.349-50.)

However, the State filed a copy of the stipulated motion containing its “[o]bjection to any
further continuances.”

(R., pp.361-62.)

Mr. Eiland also filed a separate motion to

continue trial. (R., pp.359-60.)
Mr. Eiland noticed his motion for funds, motion in limine, and motion for a
continuance for hearing on September 11, 2015. (R., pp.351, 355, 359.) At a pretrial
conference before that date, conducted in front of a district judge different from the one
who would preside over the trial, Mr. Eiland stated he was not ready to go “[b]ecause I
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still have an expert testimony still outstanding . . . I still need funds for my investigator to
continue his interviews of witnesses . . . [and] I have ran out of funds . . . .”
(Tr., Aug. 21, 2015, p.35, L.2 – p.36, L.19.) Mr. Eiland also stated “I need more funding
and I need money put on my phone account at the county jail for I can talk to my expert
witnesses. That money has expired.” (Tr., Aug. 21, 2015, p.38, Ls.2-5.) The district
court observed the only thing scheduled for that day was a pretrial conference, and it
would be premature to continue the trial because that would be more appropriately
addressed on the date when the motions had been noticed for hearing.

(See

Tr., Aug. 21, 2015, p.38, L.6 – p.39, L.3.) Thus, the district court left the trial on the
calendar. (Tr., Aug. 21, 2015, p.39, Ls.1-3.)
The State then filed a Second Amended Information that removed the
aggravated battery count and only charged Mr. Eiland with battery with intent to commit
a serious felony, burglary, and a persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
(R., pp.443-45.)
At the September 11, 2015 hearing on Mr. Eiland’s motions, Mr. Eiland told the
district court (the district judge who would preside over the trial) that he had run out of
money to call his expert witness. (See Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.2, Ls.16-23.) Mr. Eiland’s
standby counsel stated Dr. Reisberg “won’t do anything until he talks to Mr. Eiland in
person. And he’s not been able to do so because he doesn’t have any money on his
books to talk to Mr. [sic] Reisberg.” (Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.3, Ls.16-22.) The State
objected to the motion for a continuance, on the grounds that the State was prejudiced,
the case had been going on for a year, and the motion was “another means of delay.”
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.4, L.5 – p.5, L.10.)

8

The district court denied Mr. Eiland’s last motion for a continuance:
I have continued this case four times. I think I made abundantly clear the
last time that I wouldn’t continue it again without an extraordinary reason.
And tried to make—fashion orders to make funds available to Mr. Eiland
using county and—and people to assist him to the best of the Court’s
ability, and I continued it several times so that he could do the proper
preparation that he wanted to do. But at this time, we’re ready to go trial.
The case is—it’s been, as you say, almost a year. Mr. Eiland has been
sitting in the county jail. And we’re going to trial on Monday. So, the
motion to continue is denied.
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.5, Ls.11-23; see R., pp.493-95.)
Mr. Eiland offered objections to the district court’s denial, asserting the district
court should take into consideration the defendant’s having his expert witnesses
available to testify in court, the district court had not previously asked him if his expert
witnesses would be ready to testify on the day of trial, and he had other pending
motions that needed to be done. (See Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.5, L.24 – p.6, L.24.) The
district court stated it had previously talked about having plenty of time for Mr. Eiland’s
expert to be available, Mr. Eiland had ample notice of the time, and the district court had
not received any indication from any expert witness of their availability or their
unavailability. (See Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.6, L.25 – p.7, L.13.) According to the district
court, “what it’s looking to the Court at this time we’re just continuing to delay.”
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.7, Ls.13-14.) The district court then denied Mr. Eiland’s other
motions. (See Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.7, Ls.17-22; R., pp.493-95.)
With respect to a motion to compel discovery filed by the State, Mr. Eiland’s
standby counsel reiterated she had been communicating via email with Dr. Reisberg,
but Dr. Reisberg would not do anything until he talked to Mr. Eiland. (Tr., Sept. 11,
2015, p.11, Ls.7-21; R., pp.448-51.) When Mr. Eiland represented that Dr. Reisberg
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had been retained as an expert, the district court clarified it had not received anything
stating Dr. Reisberg was available for trial. (See Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.11, L.22 – p.12,
L.22.) The district court stated it had “never received anything indicating he was willing
and able to testify, available, that he had any information he could provide, and so the
Court didn’t do anything further to authorize his payment or get him as a defense
expert.” (Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.13, Ls.14-18.)

The district court ultimately denied the

State’s motion to compel. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.14, Ls.16-17.)
The case proceeded to Mr. Eiland’s jury trial. (R., pp.688-707, 744-91, 794-99.)
A manager of the Wal-Mart in Ponderay, a city adjacent to Sandpoint, testified a man
had purchased bear spray and zip ties from the Wal-Mart about two hours before the
incident. (See Tr., Sept. 15, 2015, p.137, L.22 – p.138, L.10, p.140, L.7 – p.151, L.13.)
The State during closing arguments contended the Wal-Mart video footage of the man
showed Mr. Eiland.

(Tr., Sept. 17, 2015, p.449, Ls.1-9; see State’s Ex. 40.)

Mr. Schneck testified for the defense he had examined Mr. Eiland’s jacket and found no
bear spray on it. (See Tr., Sept. 16, 2015, p.386, L.25 – p.387, L.4, p.392, L.21 – p.396,
L.10.) The jury found Mr. Eiland guilty of battery with intent to commit a serious felony
and burglary. (R., pp.800-01.) The district court then found Mr. Eiland was a persistent
violator. (Tr., Sept. 17, 2015, p.489, Ls.1-17; R., p.802.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of life imprisonment, with twenty
years fixed. (R., pp.850-53.) Mr. Eiland filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district
court’s Felony Judgment (Sentence Imposed). (R., pp.855-59.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Eiland’s last motion for a
continuance because the denial prejudiced his due process right to a fair trial?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Eiland’s Last Motion For A
Continuance Because The Denial Prejudiced His Due Process Right To A Fair Trial
A.

Introduction
Mr. Eiland asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his last

motion for a continuance because the denial prejudiced Mr. Eiland’s due process right
to a fair trial. The district court had previously ordered it would provide funding for
expert assistance from Dr. Reisberg on witness cross-contamination, on the condition
Mr. Eiland first showed Dr. Reisberg would be available for trial and willing and able to
testify for the defense. Thus, the district court essentially ruled Dr. Reisberg’s expert
assistance would be necessary for a fair trial and a meaningful opportunity to present a
defense. The denial of the motion for a continuance, by preventing Mr. Eiland from
using Dr. Reisberg’s necessary expert assistance, prejudiced Mr. Eiland’s due process
right to a fair trial. The district court therefore abused its discretion. The State will be
unable to prove the district court’s denial of the last motion for a continuance was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the discretion of

the district court.” State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 736 (2010). In determining
whether a district court abused its discretion, an appellate court conducts a multi-tiered
inquiry into whether the district court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion,
acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to specific choice, and reached its decision by an exercise of
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reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). Further, “[i]n the context of a
motion for a continuance, an appellant must show that his or her substantial rights were
prejudiced by reason of the denial of a motion for continuance.” Thorngren, 149 Idaho
at 736.
C.

The Denial Of The Last Motion For A Continuance Prejudiced Mr. Eiland’s Due
Process Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Eiland asserts the denial of his last motion for a continuance prejudiced his

due process right to a fair trial, because the denial prevented him from using
Dr. Reisberg’s expert assistance, which the district court had previously essentially
ruled would be necessary for a fair trial and a meaningful opportunity to present
a defense.
“The Due Process Clause guarantees every defendant the right to a trial
comporting with basic tenets of fundamental fairness.” State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241,
248 (2008) (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981); Turner v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1965)). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized
“[t]he denial of access to the basic tools of an adequate defense impinges on the
defendant’s due process right to a fair trial.” State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 419
(2015) (citing State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395 (1982)). Similarly, the United States
Supreme Court has held “a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds
against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw
materials integral to the building of an effective defense.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68, 77 (1985).
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The Idaho Supreme Court in Olin observed that I.C. § 19-852(a) “recognizes that
there are cases where a criminal defendant’s right to fair trial may be jeopardized unless
there is access not only to an attorney, but also to certain specialized aid in the
preparation of a defense.” Olin, 103 Idaho at 394. However, “[t]he constitution does not
require a state to provide expert or investigative assistance merely because a defendant
requests it.”

Id.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[b]efore authorizing the

expenditure of public funds for a particular purpose in an indigent’s defense, the trial
court must determine whether the funds are necessary in the interest of justice.”
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 382 (2013) (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53,
65 (2003)).

“A defendant’s request for expert or investigative services should be

reviewed in light of all circumstances and be measured against the standard of
‘fundamental fairness’ embodied in the due process clause.” Id. (quoting Lovelace, 140
Idaho at 65).
In Ake, the United States Supreme Court wrote it had “often reaffirmed that
fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to ‘an adequate opportunity to present
their claims fairly within the adversary system.’” Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)). The Ake Court held, in the context of a capital case,
“that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the
offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the
defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” Id.
at 83.

In deciding whether the participation of a psychiatric expert was important

enough to preparation of a defense to require the State to provide an indigent defendant
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with access, the Ake Court considered three factors: the private interest that would be
affected by the action of the State, the governmental interest that would be affected if
the safeguard were provided, and the probable value of the safeguards sought and the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards were not
provided. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Abdullah held “[t]here is little or no substantive
difference between the Ake standards and this Court’s standards in Olin, Lovelace, and
Dunlap.”

Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 420.

The Abdullah Court continued: “While this

Court’s precedent and the Ake factors articulate the test differently, ‘each of these cases
requires the provision of assistance at public expense where it is necessary for a fair
trial and a meaningful opportunity to present a defense, while sifting out requests for
services that are not shown to be reasonably necessary for these purposes.’”

Id.

(quoting State v. Martin, 146 Idaho 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2008)).2
Here, by authorizing funds to allow Mr. Eiland to hire Dr. Reisberg, on the
condition Mr. Eiland first show Dr. Reisberg was available to testify the week of trial and
willing and able to testify for the defense, the district court essentially ruled
Dr. Reisberg’s expert assistance on co-witness contamination was necessary for a fair
trial and a meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense. Mr. Eiland’s letter to the district
court requested a court order “granting him funding for [Mr.] Daniel Reisberg,
Psychology Department on co-witness contamination.” (R., p.285.)

Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 governs motions requesting expert or other defense
services. I.C.R. 12.2. However, Mr. Eiland’s request for funds to hire Dr. Reisberg did
not reference Rule 12.2 (see R., pp.284-85), nor did the district court’s order
conditionally granting the request (see R., pp.302-04).
2
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At the hearing on the request for funds for Dr. Reisberg’s services, Mr. Eiland
provided the district court with a copy of Dr. Reisberg’s curriculum vitae and an email
outlining Dr. Reisberg’s hourly rate. (See Tr., June 15, 2015, p.20, L.9 – p.21, L.4;
Email from Dr. Daniel Reisberg, June 1, 2015; Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Daniel Reisberg,
Sept. 14, 2006.)3 Dr. Reisberg’s email stated “the issue is (in my jargon) ‘co-witness
contamination,’” and he had testified as an expert in two other Idaho cases. (Email from
Dr. Reisberg.)

Dr. Reisberg’s curriculum vitae stated he was a Professor at Reed

College and had a Ph.D. in psychology.

(Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Reisberg, p.1.)

Dr. Reisberg had conducted at least two presentations on eyewitness identification, and
he had been a consultant and expert witness in judicial proceedings concerning
eyewitness testimony.

(Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Reisberg, pp.14-15.) Mr. Eiland

explained he wanted Dr. Reisberg to testify on the possible cross-contamination of
witnesses, because the alleged victims “were all interviewed at one time together; they
were not separated.” (Tr., June 15, 2015, p.21, Ls.5-11.)
The district court told Mr. Eiland, “I’ll take a look at his information and I’ll do a
decision in writing. I just want to try to see what he has to say about what he does,
okay?” (Tr., June 15, 2015, p.21, Ls.16-19.) In the district court’s order on the request,
the district court stated, “[u]pon a showing that the defendant’s requested expert,
Dr. Daniel Reisberg from Reed College in Portland, Oregon, is available to testify the
week of trial—August 10 through August 14, 2015—and is willing and able to testify for

Dr. Reisberg’s email and curriculum vitae are the subjects of Mr. Eiland’s Motion to
Augment the Record, filed alongside this Appellant’s Brief.

3
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the defense in this case, the Court will authorize a reasonable amount of funds to allow
Mr. Eiland to hire Dr. Reisberg as a defense expert in this matter.” (R., p.304.)
When it conditionally granted Mr. Eiland’s request for funds for Dr. Reisberg, the
district court did not require Mr. Eiland to provide further information on why
Dr. Reisberg’s expert assistance would be necessary for an adequate defense. (See
R., p.304.) Rather, the district court only conditioned the funds on Mr. Eiland showing
Dr. Reisberg would be available the week of trial and willing and able to testify for the
defense. (See R., p.304.) As discussed above, the cases on expert assistance from
the Idaho Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court “require[] the provision of
assistance at public expense where it is necessary for a fair trial and a meaningful
opportunity to present a defense.” Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 420 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Thus, even though the district court did not expressly refer to the

constitutional standards on requests for expert assistance by indigent criminal
defendants (see R., pp.302-04), by conditionally granting Mr. Eiland’s request the
district court essentially ruled Dr. Reisberg’s expert assistance on co-witness
contamination was necessary for a fair trial and a meaningful opportunity to prepare a
defense. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 77; Olin, 103 Idaho at 395.
After essentially ruling Dr. Reisberg’s expert assistance was necessary for a fair
trial and a meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense, the district court prejudiced
Mr. Eiland’s right to a fair trial by denying his last motion for a continuance. The district
court conditionally granted Mr. Eiland’s request on June 16, 2015.

(R., p.304.)

However, at the hearing on the last motion for a continuance, Mr. Eiland explained he
“had ran out of money to call his expert witness” around August 15, 2015.
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(See

Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.2, Ls.22-23.) Mr. Eiland had also informed the other district judge
at the pretrial conference he had run out of money to call his expert witnesses. (See
Tr., Aug. 21, 2015, p.38, Ls.2-5.)

Standby counsel stated Dr. Reisberg “won’t do

anything until he talks to Mr. Eiland in person. And he’s not been able to do that
because he doesn’t have any money on his books to talk to Mr. [sic] Reisberg.”
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.3, Ls.19-22.)
The district court, when it denied the motion for a continuance, stated, ‘I haven’t
received any indication from any expert witness that they—of their availability or
nonavailability.”

(Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.7, Ls.11-13.)

After Mr. Eiland mentioned

Dr. Reisberg later in the hearing, the district court stated, “[t]he Court never received
anything indicating he was willing and able to testify, available, that he had any
information he could provide, and so the Court didn’t do anything further to authorize his
payment or get him as a defense expert.” (See Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.13, Ls.14-18.)
However, at least from around August 15, 2015, Mr. Eiland would have been
unable to show Dr. Reisberg was available and willing and able to testify, because he
had run out of money to make phone calls and Dr. Reisberg insisted on speaking with
him directly. (See Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.2, L.22 – p.3, L.22.) In fact, Mr. Eiland did not
receive additional funds to contact his expert witnesses until the district court, after the
hearing on the last motion for a continuance, granted the State’s motion to add
additional funds to Mr. Eiland’s phone account. (See R., pp.491-92, 496.) Without
being able to call Dr. Reisberg and thereby confirm his availability, Mr. Eiland would not
have been able to make the showing required by the district court’s conditional grant.
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Further, nothing in the district court’s reasoning for the denial contradicted its
earlier decision conditionally granting the request for funds for Dr. Reisberg, where the
district court essentially ruled Dr. Reisberg’s expert assistance was necessary for an
adequate defense. (See generally Tr., Sept. 11, 2015, p.5, L.11 – p.13, L.19.) As
explored above, the Idaho Supreme Court in Olin wrote “there are cases where a
criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial may be jeopardized unless there is access not
only to an attorney, but also to certain specialized aid in the preparation of a defense.”
Olin, 103 Idaho at 394. The United States Supreme Court in Ake likewise held “a
criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant
without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of
an effective defense.”

Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.

The district court here had already

essentially ruled Dr. Reisberg’s expert assistance on co-witness contamination was
necessary for a fair trial and a meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense. By denying
Mr. Eiland’s last motion for a continuance, the district court deprived Mr. Eiland of the
chance to confirm Dr. Reisberg’s availability and use his necessary expert assistance.
Thus, the district court’s denial of the last motion for a continuance prejudiced
Mr. Eiland’s due process right to a fair trial.
Because the denial of the last motion for a continuance prejudiced Mr. Eiland’s
due process right to a fair trial, the district court abused its discretion when it denied the
motion. See Thorngren, 149 Idaho at 736.
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D.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The District Court’s Denial Of The Last
Motion For A Continuance Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the

appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

See

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). “To hold an error as harmless, an appellate
court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable
possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.” State v.
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
Here, the State will be unable to prove that the district court’s denial of
Mr. Eiland’s last motion for a continuance is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As
Mr. Eiland represented in support of his request for funds for Dr. Reisberg’s expert
assistance (see Tr., June 15, 2015, p.21, Ls.5-11), the three alleged victims were
interviewed by the police simultaneously. The audio from Officer Inman’s dash cam
footage, which was published to the jury at the trial, depicts the Saieds being
interviewed at the scene at the same time. (See Tr., Sept. 15, 2015, p.27, L.5 – p.29,
L.11; Def. Ex. A.)

That circumstance presented the possibility of co-witness

contamination, which could have affected the reliability of the Saieds’ eyewitness
identifications.
In the context of whether an out-of-court identification violates due process, the
Idaho Supreme Court has stated it “is aware of the dangers of erroneous eyewitness
identification.” State v. Almarez, 154 Idaho 584, 593 (2013). The Almarez Court wrote
that “[t]he New Jersey Supreme Court recently undertook a very thorough examination
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of the current state of scientific research regarding eyewitness identifications” in State v.
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 885 (2011). The Almarez Court held, “[w]e agree with the
New Jersey Supreme Court and find that this extensive research convincingly
demonstrates the fallibility of eyewitness identification testimony and pinpoints an array
of variables that are most likely to lead to a mistaken identification.” Almarez, 154 Idaho
at 593.
“Cross-contamination” has been defined as “the means by which one person’s
judgment is tainted by the decisions and conclusions of other actors.”

Erik Luna,

System Failure, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1201, 1214 (2005). The New Jersey Supreme
Court in Henderson examined a form of cross-contamination or co-witness
contamination. One of the “estimator variables,”4 or “factors related to the witness, the
perpetrator, or the event itself—like distance, lighting, or stress—over which the legal
system has no control,” identified by the Henderson Court was “feedback from cowitnesses confirming the identification of a perpetrator.” Almarez, 154 Idaho at 251-52
(quoting Henderson, 27 A.3d at 904-09). The Henderson Court observed that “[s]tudies
show that witness memories can be altered when co-eyewitnesses share information
about what they observed. . .

Feedback and suggestiveness can come from co-

witnesses and others not connected to the State.” Henderson, 27 A.3d at 908. The
Henderson Court also stated, “[c]o-witness feedback may cause a person to form a
false memory of details that he or she never actually observed.” Id.
The Henderson Court found “that non-State actors like co-witnesses and other
sources of information can affect the independent nature and reliability of identification
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evidence and inflate witness confidence—in the same way that law enforcement
feedback can. As a result, law enforcement officers should instruct witnesses not to
discuss the identification process with fellow witnesses or obtain information from other
sources.” Id. at 909.
In this case, the eyewitness identification by the Saieds exhibited signs of cowitness feedback or co-witness contamination. The audio from Officer’s Inman’s dash
cam footage, portraying when all three of the alleged victims were interviewed together
at the scene, includes Ms. Saied stating the man had a red ski jacket. (See Def. Ex. A.,
10:15 to 10:35; R., pp.530-31 (transcript of the dash cam footage)).

At the trial,

Ms. Saied testified she remembered the man wearing a red jacket, and she had been
behind her husband when she saw the man come up the stairs. (Tr., Sept. 14, 2015,
p.39, Ls.2-10.)
When asked about the man’s height, Mala stated on the dash cam footage, “I
barely saw him. It was yeah, about taller than you.” (See Def. Ex. A, 10:10 to 10:15;
R., p.530.) However, at the trial Mala testified she had run into the bedroom, “[a]nd I
didn’t see him.” (See Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.78, Ls.3-12.) She testified she saw “a bit of
a red jacket and a hand coming through the door spraying. So that’s all I saw of him.”
(Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.83, L.25 – p.84, L.5.) On cross-examination, Mala testified she
“saw a red jacket,” and she based her identification of the subject outside the
Department of Labor as the man in the house on his wearing a red jacket.

(See

Tr., Sept. 14, 2015, p.85, Ls.1-19.)

The other type of variables is “system variables,” or factors that are “within the control
of the criminal justice system.” Almarez, 154 Idaho at 593; Henderson, 27 A.3d at 895.

4
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Here, the officers interviewed the Saieds at the scene at the same time, without
taking any steps to ensure they would not “discuss the identification process with fellow
witnesses or obtain information from other sources.” See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 909.
Thus, this case presented the possibility of co-witness feedback or co-witness
contamination affecting the reliability of the Saieds’ eyewitness identifications.
Dr. Reisberg’s testimony on co-witness contamination could have helped illustrate for
the jury how, for example, Mala’s exposure to identifications given by other witnesses
might have affected the independence or reliability of her identification. See id. at 90709. Even if Dr. Reisberg did not testify for the defense, his expert assistance could
have helped Mr. Eiland with cross-examination and other challenges to the State’s use
of eyewitness identification. Thus, there is a reasonable possibility the denial of the
motion for a continuance, which prevented Mr. Eiland from using Dr. Reisberg’s
necessary expert assistance on co-witness contamination, contributed to the verdict.
The State will be unable to prove that the district court’s denial of Mr. Eiland’s last
motion for a continuance is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Perry, 150 Idaho
at 227.
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Eiland’s last motion for
a continuance because the denial prejudiced Mr. Eiland’s due process right to a fair
trial. The State will be unable to prove that the district court’s denial of Mr. Eiland’s last
motion for a continuance is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Mr. Eiland’s
judgment of conviction should be vacated, the order denying his last motion for a
continuance should be reversed, and the case should be remanded to the district court
for further proceedings.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Eiland respectfully requests this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction, reverse the order denying his last motion for a continuance,
and remand his case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 20th day of September, 2016.

____________/s/_____________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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